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Abstract
This paper studies how national sentiment in the form of either a perception
or a loyalty bias of bettors may affect pricing patterns on national wagering
markets for international sport events.We show theoretically that both biases
can be profitably exploited by bookmakers by way of price adjustment (odds
shading). The former bias induces bookmakers to shade odds against the do-
mestic team, the latter to adjust them in a way that depends on the demand
elasticity of bettors for their national favorite.Analyzing empirically a unique
data set of betting quotas from online bookmakers in twelve European coun-
triesforqualificationgamestotheUEFAEuro2008,wefindevidenceforsys-
tematic biases in the pricing of own national teams in the odds for win offered
across countries.Variations in the sign and magnitude of these deviations can
be explained by differences across countries in the respective strengths of the
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Consumer preferences for home country products, ”buy domestic” campaigns, the issuing and
success of war bonds, or the home equity puzzle in international ﬁnancial markets suggest that na-
tional sentiment may be of importance for individual consumption and investment choices. Little
empirical research, however, has been done to substantiate such conjectures.1 This paper con-
tributes to this insuﬃciently researched area in economics by studying the international football
betting market, a market that is likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by national sentiment.
The online betting market in international football exhibits a number of features that make it par-
ticularly suited for analyzing the inﬂuence of national sentiment on economic behavior. First, there
appears to be a strong bonding of patriotism and sports, especially in football, the most popular
sport in Europe. Second, information on the quality of national teams and odds marketed (prices
oﬀered by bookmakers) should be largely symmetric across countries, as detailed information, in-
cluding statistics on past performance of teams and expert analyses, can be obtained online easily,
quickly, and at negligible if not zero cost. Given our focus on online wagering, access of bettors
to this source of information is furthermore warranted. Third, there is a single homogeneous good
traded on this market (”outcome of a game”). Variations in prices across countries therefore can-
not be caused by (potentially unobservable) diﬀerences in the respective products traded. Finally,
online betting markets in Europe still appear segmented between countries, as legal constraints,
language barriers, and transactions costs impede wagering abroad.2
Segmentation of national betting markets (pools of bettors) is important for our analysis. With
a homogeneous product and symmetric information, prices (quotas) should be identical across
countries if markets are uniﬁed. With segmented markets, however, prices may diﬀer. They will
diﬀer in terms of the average payout per monetary unit waged, if diﬀerent industry structures
across countries support diﬀerent markups charged by bookmakers. They will also diﬀer in terms
of relative quotas for particular outcomes of a game, if bookmakers can proﬁtably exploit either a
perception bias among bettors that induces them to overrate the winning chances of their national
team, or a loyalty bias that keeps bettors from wagering against their own team even under favor-
able odds. Both type of biases reﬂect bettor sentiment. Empirical support for their inﬂuence on
betting market outcomes has been found for club sports at national level.3 Among the extensive
1See, for example, Shankarmahesh (2006) for evidence on consumer ethnocentrism, or the recent work by Morse
and Shive (2006) on the importance of patriotism for the portfolio choices of domestic investors.
2For a recent survey of national regulations in European countries governing online wagering markets, see
Williams and Wood (2007). In a perfectly uniﬁed market, competitive pressures should eliminate excess proﬁts
of bookmakers. For our sample of European countries, however, we show in Section 3 that the ﬁxed markups
charged by online bookmakers in diﬀerent countries vary considerably.
3On the perception bias, see for example, the study by Levitt (2004) which explores wagering behavior on NFL
games in the US. Evidence for the loyalty bias is provided by Forrest and Simmons (2008) who analyze wagering
on top tier Spanish and Scottish football.
4and growing body of literature on sports wagering, however, no study has yet explored betting
markets across countries, let alone the inﬂuence of national sentiment on cross-country diﬀerences
in wagering behavior.4 In theoretical models of wagering markets, in turn, only the misperception
bias has yet been formally modeled and analyzed. And as regards wagering on European football,
that is the very context of our analysis, but a single study has explored this bias and then only by
means of a numerical example (Kuypers, 2000).
This paper develops a theoretical model of wagering markets that allows for both types of biases
and it provides ﬁrst empirical evidence on their inﬂuence on betting odds for international sport
events in a cross-country context. Based on a unique data set of betting quotas from online book-
makers in twelve European countries for qualiﬁcation games to the UEFA Euro 2008, we analyze
diﬀerences in odds for win oﬀered across countries for evidence of systematic biases in the pricing of
domestic teams. For the majority of countries in our sample, we ﬁnd evidence for such systematic
biases. Variations in the sign and magnitude of these deviations can be explained by diﬀerences in
the respective strengths between countries of the perception and the loyalty bias among bettors.
Overall, our empirical results provide strong evidence for a sizeable inﬂuence of national sentiment
on wagering market outcomes in Europe.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyzes theoretically the price setting behavior of
a bookmaker in the absence and in the presence of bettor national sentiment as expressed in a
perception or a loyalty bias. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents and discusses the
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
On wagering markets, prices (odds) are set by bookmakers. Hence, for prices to be informative
about any national sentiment of bettors, it must be proﬁtable for bookmakers to shade their odds
when faced with such underlying bettor preferences. This we show in this section by studying the
price setting behavior of a proﬁt-maximizing (risk-neutral) bookmaker in the absence and in the
presence of bettor national sentiment. We ﬁrst describe the model setup in the absence of any
perception and loyalty bias of bettors and then examine their respective eﬀects on bookmaker odds
oﬀered.
To formalize the decision problem of the bookmaker, consider a football match between countries
A and B and assume, for simplicity, that there are only two potential outcomes, either country
A or country B wins.5 Wagering markets are assumed to be separated between countries and to
4For a comprehensive survey of the economics literature on sports wagering markets, see Sauer (1998).
5See Kuypers (2000) for a related model that allows for three distinct outcomes. In the empirical analysis, we
concentrate solely on the eﬀect of national sentiment on odds for win of the home team. Accordingly, one may
re-interpret the model as distinguishing between the outcomes ‘win’ and ‘non-win’ of a team.
5be served each by a single bookmaker. Bettors in both countries may hence place bets only with
their respective domestic bookmaker. Information on the quality of national teams is furthermore
assumed to be freely available and symmetric across countries, bookmakers, and bettors. In the
absence of any national sentiment bias, quotas marketed in countries A and B would hence be
identical.
Given the symmetric setup for the two countries, we can restrict the analysis in the following
without loss of generality to the pricing behavior of a bookmaker in just one of the countries, say
country A. The choice variable of the bookmaker in country A is the probability a ∈ [0,1] of
win for country A. The resulting odds for this outcome as oﬀered by the bookmaker (the quota
marketed), is just the inverse of this probability, i.e. 1
a, or simply the payout for a single monetary
unit waged on this event.6 Likewise, the probability and the resulting odds for win of country
B are given by 1 − a and 1
1−a, respectively. The bookmaker’s subjective probability for win of
country A, denoted ˆ a, need not coincide with probability a underlying the odds actually oﬀered to
bettors.
Regarding the behavior of bettors, we ﬁrst assume in line with Kuypers (2000) and Levitt (2004)
that the decision of bettors to enter the market (to place a bet on the game) has already been
made and concentrate on how punters spread the total volume of bets on the two outcomes. Each
bettor is assumed to place a monetary unit on one of the two teams. A bettor will place her
money on country A, if a is equal to or greater than her subjective probability for win of country
A. Otherwise, she will bet on country B. Let f(a) represent the fraction of punters that for a
given probability a will bet on country A. The function f(a) is assumed to be nondecreasing in a,
diﬀerentiable, and known to the bookmaker.
The bookmaker’s expected proﬁt on a unit bet on one of the two teams is the unit itself minus
the expected payout. The latter is given by the corresponding odds multiplied by the subjective
outcome probability of the bookmaker. To obtain total proﬁts per unit bet, the (per unit) proﬁt
generated by a bet on one of the two teams has to be weighted by the corresponding fraction of









1 − ˆ a
1 − a

(1 − f(a)). (1)
The bookmaker will choose a as to maximize expression (1). The corresponding ﬁrst-order condi-















1 − ˆ a
(1 − a)2(1 − f(a)), (2)
6In the empirical part, we will account for the fact that bookmakers typically charge a ﬁxed markup. Here we
abstract from such markups, as they would merely complicate the model but not aﬀect any of the theoretical results.
6which is fulﬁlled at the optimal a = a∗. The terms on the left-hand side of the equation represent
the marginal beneﬁts of a small increase in the probability a, while the right-hand side contains the
corresponding marginal costs. Since a reﬂects the probability for country A winning the match,
an increase in a translates into lower odds for bets on team A. Consequently, the bookmaker’s
expected proﬁt for any monetary unit placed on country A increases in a, as reﬂected by the ﬁrst
term on the left-hand side of equation (2). However, lower odds also induce punters to switch
to team B so that the expected gross proﬁt per-unit bet on country A now applies to a smaller
fraction f(a) of bettors (ﬁrst term on the right-hand side). For bets waged on team B, the ﬁndings
are just reversed as the corresponding probability 1 − a gets smaller.
Within this basic analytical framework, we can now explore the two pathways by which bettor
national sentiment may aﬀect pricing patterns on domestic wagering markets. We consider the
perception bias ﬁrst.
2.1 Perception Bias
National sentiment may bias bettors’ perceptions of the winning chances of their national team
upwards.7 If so, then for any given probability set by the bookmaker, the fraction of bettors
placing a bet on country A is equal to or greater than the corresponding fraction in the absence of
a perception bias. The bookmaker is hence faced with a function fBias(a) such that fBias(a) ≥
f(a)∀a ∈ [0,1]. Assuming that the slopes of the two functions coincide at a = a∗, i.e. fBias (a∗)=
f (a∗),8 and provided that fBias(a∗) >f (a∗), a perception bias among bettors unambiguously
increases the bookmaker’s proﬁt-maximizing choice of the probability a for win of country A.
This ﬁnding can be appreciated by inspecting the ﬁrst-oder condition at a = a∗. When bettors
overrate the winning chances of the domestic team, marginal beneﬁts to the bookmaker of an
increase in a rise, because the higher expected proﬁt per unit bet on country A now applies to a
larger fraction of bettors. At the same time, the corresponding marginal costs decline, as lower
expected proﬁts on any monetary unit waged on country B now accrue only for a reduced fraction
1 − fBias(a∗) of bettors. It is therefore unambiguously proﬁtable for the bookmaker to increase
probability a and thereby reduce the odds for win of team A oﬀered to bettors. It is straightforward
to show that this result also holds when the bookmaker’s subjective probability ˆ a is biased upwards
7In principle, one may also allow for under-conﬁdence in the national team. However, the (albeit rare) existing
evidence suggests that supporters, if at all biased in their perceptions, tend to over- rather than under-estimate the
winning chances of their own team (see Babad and Katz, 1991).
8Alternatively, one can assume that the responsiveness of bettors to the odds oﬀered by the bookmaker is larger
(smaller) with biased perceptions than without, i.e fBias (a∗) >f  (a∗)( fBias (a∗) <f  (a∗)). The eﬀects identiﬁed
in the following are then still present. But the negative eﬀect of an increase in a on the fraction of bettors wagering
on country A would be more (less) pronounced, and the positive eﬀect on the fraction 1 − f(a) would be reinforced
(dampened). The bookmaker would hence face two additional eﬀects that pull odds into diﬀerent directions.
7by national sentiment as well.9 In fact, the bookmaker’s tendency to reduce the odds for win of
team A will be reinforced in this case.
Summarizing the above, the more conﬁdent are bettors regarding the success probability of their
home team, that is the stronger is the perception bias, the lower will be the actual odds for such
an outcome oﬀered by the domestic bookmaker. A similar point has been made by Kuypers (2000)
by means of an illustrative numerical example. He shows that a bookmaker may take advantage
of bettors who overrate the winning chances of their favorite team by shading odds against this
team.
2.2 Loyalty Bias
Up to now it was assumed that punters always place a bet on a game. Their only decision therefore
concerned how to spread their betting stakes over the two possible match outcomes. However, as
noted but not formalized by Forrest and Simmons (2008), wagering against the own team may well
be unacceptable to supporters.10 Viewed as an act of disloyalty, supporters may just be interested
in a bet on their team or none at all (loyalty bias).11
If bettors only consider whether or not to bet on their national team, the actual betting volume is no
longer ﬁxed, only the potential one.12 If the bookmaker sets probability a below the corresponding
subjective probability of a loyal bettor for win of the own national team, this bettor will not switch
to wager money on country B but instead refrain from wagering altogether. The bookmaker’s
proﬁt function hence consists only of the ﬁrst term of equation (1), i.e. the proﬁt generated by









As is evident from equation (3), the impact of a loyalty bias of bettors on oﬀered quotas can not
be unambiguously determined. The probability chosen by the bookmaker will increase (decrease)
whenever at a = a∗ marginal beneﬁts of further increases in a are larger (smaller) than the
corresponding marginal losses, i.e. whenever at a = a∗ the left hand-side of equation (3) exceeds
the right-hand side. Beneﬁts arise from higher expected proﬁts per unit bet and losses from a
reduction in the actual betting volume. If the behavioral response of bettors to changes in a
9Levitt (2004), however, presents evidence that bookmakers are more skilled than bettors at predicting match
outcomes. This ﬁnding suggests that bookmakers, if anything, are less aﬀected by any sentiment in their assessment
of objective outcome probabilities.
10Committed bettors, the authors note, might be as unwilling to switch bets to the opponent team if odds on win
oﬀered for the own team get unfavorable, as they are unlikely to switch to replica shirts of the opponent team only
because these got relatively cheaper.
11To the best of our knowledge, the prevalence and hence importance of such bettor loyalty has not yet been
researched. A cursory survey of football blogs on the internet we conducted, however, produced numerous incidences
in which football fans judged wagering against the own team as utterly unacceptable.
12One could also assume that only a fraction of bettors exhibits a loyalty bias. For the sign of the induced
deviation in marketed odds, however, such change in assumption is immaterial.
8is suﬃciently strong, i.e. if f (a∗) is suﬃciently large, odds for win of country A will actually
be biased in favor of domestic bettors. Note that by increasing marginal beneﬁts, an additional
perception bias among bettors will as before increase the probability a set by the bookmaker.
Summarizing our analysis of the loyalty bias, if national sentiments induce bettors to wager, if at
all, only on win for their home team, then domestic bookmakers may proﬁtably bias odds in favor
of rather than against committed bettors. More favorable odds on win for domestic teams, if indeed
observed in the data, therefore provide evidence for a loyalty bias of domestic bettors. Although
bettors need not necessarily be free of a perception bias in this case, any over-conﬁdence on their
part would have to be very weak. If, in contrast, odds on win for domestic teams are found to be
less favorable, national sentiment in the form of either or both a perception and loyalty bias may
sign responsible. While deviations, however signed, in the probabilities underlying odds for win
of the domestic team therefore provide evidence for an inﬂuence of national sentiment on bettor
behavior, only negative biases produce suﬃcient information to assess the respective strengths of
the perception and loyalty bias.
3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset of betting quotas that we collected from online
bookmakers in twelve European countries for qualiﬁcation games of national football teams to
the UEFA Euro 2008. The dozen countries sampled represent a selective subset of the 50 UEFA
member countries participating in the qualiﬁcation, including both some potential favorites as
well as likely underdogs. The bets considered are simple bets on home win, draw, and away win
(respectively, quotaH, quotaD, and quotaA). Quotas for games were collected online in the morning
of a qualiﬁcation round in random order across countries to avoid potential sampling bias due to
systematic early or late recording. Online bookmakers for the twelve countries considered were
primarily selected from members of the European Lotteries and Toto Association which is composed
of State Lottery and Toto companies established in Europe.13 For each country, a bookmaker was
chosen that operated online and oﬀered simple home win, tie, and away win bets. If none of the
members of a country met these conditions, we selected a large private online bookmaker from the
internet.14 Throughout this process, we disregarded bookmakers who operated via subsidiaries
in more than one European country.15 Table 1 describes our ﬁnal dataset, which covers betting
13See www.european-lotteries.org.
14For Germany, we had to drop the state-run online bookmaker Oddset from our sample, as its online betting
service was temporarily discontinued during the observation period.
15The choice of an English bookmaker poses some problems since its service is likely to be taken up also by Scots
which do not share much sympathy with the English national team. However, the English are by far in the majority
among potential bettors in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the estimates for the national sentiment bias in
England should be taken with some caution. Dropping England from our dataset does not aﬀect the results for the
other countries.
9quotas on 218 qualiﬁcation games from 12 European countries in 6 qualiﬁcation groups, sampled
online between November 2006 and November 2007.16
Table 1: countries, bookmakers, and summary statistics
Country: Games Covered: Overround:
Name Bookmaker Group Total Home Away Mean St.d.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bulgaria∗ eurofootball.bg 7 194 4 4 0.207 0.019
Czech Republic eurotip.cz 4 217 4 4 0.110 0.007
Denmark∗ danskespil.dk 6 171 5 4 0.146 0.011
England skybet.com 5 217 4 4 0.123 0.007
France∗ fdjeux.com 2 181 4 4 0.228 0.034
Germany sportwetten-gera.de 4 210 5 4 0.122 0.008
Italy match-point.it 2 202 4 4 0.112 0.010
Netherlands∗ toto.nl (De Lotto) 7 141 4 4 0.246 0.020
Norway∗ norsk-tipping.no 3 154 5 4 0.176 0.002
Slovenia∗ sportna-loterija.si 7 200 5 4 0.149 0.018
Spain miapuesta.com 6 217 5 4 0.101 0.004
Sweden∗ svenskaspel.se 6 207 4 4 0.250 0.003
Note: ∗ denote countries for which the respective bookmaker is state run. (1): qualiﬁcation group of betting
country; (2): total number of games for which betting country has complete triplet (win, tie, loss) of quotas; (3),(4):
number of home and away games of betting country; (5): average (gross) proﬁt of bookmaker from a wager of a
punter who bets on all three match outcomes such that she collects a unit return; (6): standard deviation of average
(gross) proﬁt.
As can be seen in column (2) of Table 1, no bookmaker oﬀers bets on all games. The number of
games for which bets are oﬀered range from as few as 141 in the case of the Dutch bookmaker to
217, or almost the total number of matches sampled, for bookmakers in the Czech Republic and in
the Netherlands. To gauge the inﬂuence of any sample selection bias arising from this diﬀerential
coverage of games, we will use three estimation samples in the regression analysis. The ﬁrst, or
’Total Sample’, includes all games for which at least one bookmaker oﬀers quotas (218 games). The
second (’Restricted Sample I’) includes all games for which at least six bookmakers oﬀer quotas
(208 games), and the third (’Restricted Sample II’) all games for which at least nine bookmakers
oﬀer quotas (189 games).17 For each country in our sample, we observe a total of eight to nine
home and away matches (columns 3 and 4), that is games in which the national team takes part.
Columns (5) and (6) report means and standard deviations of the so-called overround which can be
taken as a measure of a bookmaker’s gross margin.18 As is evident, overrounds diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between bookmakers in diﬀerent countries (column 5), but vary hardly across games for individual
16Starting the research project only after the qualiﬁcation had started, we did not record the ﬁrst 5 qualiﬁcation
rounds. Our sample, however, covers 71% of all qualiﬁcation games.
17Sample sizes decline signiﬁcantly if this minimum threshold is further increased. Only for less than half of all
games covered in our data (107 games) do all twelve betting countries oﬀer quotas.
18The overround is deﬁned as the expected (gross) proﬁt a bookmaker makes from a wager of a punter who bets
on all three match outcomes such that she collects an expected unit return. For a given match, the overround is
equal to the sum of the inversed quotas minus one.
10bookmakers (column 6). The former ﬁnding supports our assumption of nationally separated online
betting markets, as such marked diﬀerences in (gross) proﬁts across countries could not persist if
betting markets were uniﬁed. The latter ﬁnding, in turn, suggests that bookmakers seek to realize
a speciﬁc gross margin. It also implies that the overround is not used by bookmakers as a means
to price potential variation across games in either outcome uncertainty or bettor sentiment.19
Measures for our primary outcome of interest considered in the theoretical analysis, the probability
of win for a domestic team, can be obtained from the respective odds oﬀered for win of the home
team in home games and of the away team in away games. As odds oﬀered to bettors also contain
the overround, however, they need to be adjusted ﬁrst so as to obtain the underlying probabilities
for the respective outcomes as marketed by bookmakers. Speciﬁcally, the implied probability of win
for the home team (aH) and the probability of win for the away team (aA) can be calculated from
the quotas bookmaker j oﬀers on match i as the inverse of the quota for the respective outcome,







where k = {H,A} and ρij is given by quotaH
ij + quotaD
ij + quotaA
ij. In the following analysis, these
probabilities will be used as our endogeneous variables to assess whether domestic teams are priced
diﬀerently at home and abroad.
4 Results
To investigate whether betting behavior in any of our twelve European countries sampled is subject
to a national sentiment bias, we run separate regressions for home (k = H) and away games (k = A)
of the following type:
ak
ij = β0 + β1(HomeGameij × Bookmakerj)+β2(AwayGameij × Bookmakerj)
+β3Bookmakerj + β4Gamei +  ij, (4)
where ak
ij is the implied probability of win for the home (away) team in game i as set by bookmaker
j, and Bookmakerj (Gamei) is a set of betting country dummies (game dummies). Game ﬁxed
eﬀects capture all relevant information on the objective winning chances of teams on the day of a
game (recall that quotas have been sampled in the morning of a qualiﬁcation round). If information
is indeed symmetric across countries, we should be able to account for most of the variation in
probabilities in the data. To capture the potential inﬂuence of national sentiment bias of bettors
on prices set, we furthermore include a full set of interaction terms of betting country identiﬁers
19A constant overround has also been found in studies on national wagering markets (see, for example, Kuypers,
2000).
11and dummies for home, respectively away game status, where HomeGameij (AwayGameij)i s
a dummy variable that indicates whether bookmaker j’s national team participates as the host
(visitor) in a particular match.20 As odds for win of the home (away) team marketed in the country
of the away (home) team may be biased as well, we also include as additional controls a set of
interaction terms of betting country identiﬁers and dummies for away (home) game status.21 Odds
oﬀered in non-participating countries to a game hence constitute our control group of objective
price measures. In regressions that use the probablity of win for the home (away) team as the
endogenous variable, our primary coeﬃcient vector of interest is β1 (β2). If wagering behavior of
domestic bettors is unaﬀected by national sentiment, that is free of any perception and loyalty
bias, then elements in β1 (β2) will be zero throughout.
As shown in Table 2, which contains the regression output for the probability of win for home
teams, we obtain an R2 ≈ 1 across the diﬀerent estimation samples considered, a consequence of
the inclusion of game dummies into the regression equation. This suggests that outcomes of games
are indeed priced very similar across bookmakers (cf. Strumpf, 2003). Of primary importance
for the purpose of our analysis, however, probabilities for home win implied by quotas oﬀered
appear systematically biased in several countries when it is their respective national team that
has the home game. Biases, however, are not uniform, either in sign or magnitude. In Bulgaria,
Denmark, and Italy, the bias is positive, in France, Slovenia, and Sweden, it is negative. Among
the former, the bias is most pronounced in Bulgaria and Denmark (approx. +5%), among the
latter it is largest in Sweden (approx. -4% each). Note that results are remarkably consistent
across estimation samples in terms of the sign, magnitude, and statistical signiﬁcance of estimated
coeﬃcients.22 Potential sampling bias due to non-coverage of particular games by bookmakers, if
indeed present at all, hence appears negligible.
Following our theoretical discussion in Section 2, the empirical ﬁnding of a downward bias in the
probability for home win in France, Slovenia, and Sweden suggests that national sentiment in these
countries primarily expresses itself in terms of committed bettors that only consider betting on
the home team if at all (loyalty bias). Bettors in these countries hence do not - or only to a very
limited degree - overrate the winning chances of their home team. The positive biases found for
Bulgaria, Denmark, and Italy can, following our formal treatment, be explained with reference
to both types of sentiment biases. Bettors may only consider bets on their home team and /
or overrate the winning chances of their national team in home games relative to the chances as
20Our estimation sample includes odds from bookmakers both for games in which the domestic team participates
and for games in which the domestic team does not participate. We can hence include a full set of interaction terms
of betting country identiﬁers and dummies for home, respectively away game status.
21Alternatively, one could drop odds oﬀered by bookmakers of opposing teams from the estimation sample.
22Only for Slovenia, does the estimated coeﬃcient, although unchanged in size, turn insigniﬁcant in the third
estimation sample.
12Table 2: ols estimates for winning probability in home games
Dependent variable: probability win home team
Covariates Total Sample Restr. Sample I Restr. Sample II














































































Away team × bookmaker interactions yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes
Game dummies yes yes yes
N 2311 2267 2131
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Total
Sample: at least 1 obs. per match; Restr. Sample I: at least 6 obs. per match; Restr. Sample II: at least 9 obs. per
match. Base group: betting countries not participating in a game.
they are on average marketed in countries not participating in a game. If the loyalty bias were
generally negative in sign, however, bettors’ perceptions of the winning chances of their national
team would have to be signiﬁcantly upward biased for a positive bias in the odds for win for the
domestic team to be in the interest of a proﬁt-maximizing bookmaker. In this case, the magnitude
of the bias in the odds for win is again informative about the respective strengths of the two biases.
Speciﬁcally, the level of over-conﬁdence will ceteris paribus increase the degree to which odds are
biased upwards.
Rerunning the same regressions, but now with the probabilities for win in an away game as implied
by quotas set, we get results that are qualitatively identical for countries exhibiting the largest up-
ward, respectively downward bias in home games (Table 3). Speciﬁcally, in Bulgaria and Denmark
(Sweden) implied probabilities for win of the home team are again biased upwards (downwards),
albeit to a lesser degree. However, there are also some diﬀerences observable. Italian (French and
13Table 3: ols estimates for winning probability in away games
Dependent variable: probability win away team
Covariates Total Sample Restr. Sample I Restr. Sample II













































































Home team × bookmaker interactions yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes
Game dummies yes yes yes
N 2311 2267 2131
R2 0.99 0.99 0.99
Note: ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors in parentheses. Total
Sample: at least 1 obs. per match; Restr. Sample I: at least 6 obs. per match; Restr. Sample II: at least 9 obs. per
match. Base group: betting countries not participating in a game.
Slovenians) bettors, who in home games are faced with less (more) favorable odds for win of the
own team, are not confronted with such biases in away games of their national team. This may
point to a greater importance of national sentiment biases in home games. In addition, for Spain
an upward bias is observed in away but not in home games.23
Table 4 summarizes the qualitative ﬁndings of our baseline regressions. Entries along its main diag-
onal are comprised of countries that display consistent patterns regarding the presence or absence
and direction of biases in odds marketed for win of domestic teams across both home and away
games. Eight out of twelve countries in our sample, and hence the majority, belongs to this group.
The remainder (oﬀ-diagonal entries) are countries in which probabilities for win of the national
team are biased upwards or downwards in home or in away games, but not in both. Overall, we
ﬁnd evidence for systematic biases in the rating of own national teams in seven out of the twelve
23Note, however, that the estimated positive coeﬃcient for Spain in home games is only barely insigniﬁcant at
the 10% level.
14countries in our sample, with incidences of a positive bias outnumbering those of a negative bias.
The latter, as argued, can be attributed to a loyalty bias of domestic bettors for their national
team, while the former may be the result of either or both a perception and loyalty bias.
Table 4: summary of results from baseline regressions
  Home Game
Away Game
Positive Bias Negative Bias Objective
Positive Bias Bulgaria, Denmark Italy
Negative Bias Sweden France, Slovenia
Objective Spain Czech Republic
England, Germany
Netherlands, Norway
Note: ’Objective’ denotes countries which do not diﬀer in their odds for win of their domestic team from odds on
the same outcome as on averaged marketed in countries not opposing these countries. Spain (the Netherlands) only
exhibits a barely insigniﬁcant positive (negative) bias in home games.
Note that the biases emerging from our empirical analysis are diﬀerent from (and hence cannot be
explained by) a major bias investigated in the literature on sports wagering, the favorite-longshot
bias according to which favorites tend to be overbet and longhots underbet. Nor do they reﬂect
mere home team advantage, as it is diﬀerences across bookmakers in the odds for a particular
outcome of a speciﬁc game that we consider. Biases also do not resemble simple patterns of overall
country performance in the qualiﬁcation to the UEFA Euro 2008. Odds for win of the Swedish team,
for instance, have been unfavorable in Sweden, but the team safely qualiﬁed as second best in its
group. English bettors, in contrast, appear not to have suﬀered from any sentiment bias, although
their national team did not qualify for the Euro ﬁnals in Austria/Switzerland. Estimated biases
also do not ﬁt a simple national-private bookmaker divide. Among the countries with a positive
sentiment bias, there are both countries with state-run bookmakers (Bulgaria and Denmark) and
countries with private bookmakers (Italy and Spain). A negative bias, in contrast, is observable
only in countries with state-run bookmakers (France, Slovenia, Sweden), and among countries that
do not exhibit any bias at all, again both state-run (Netherlands and Norway) as well as private
bookmakers (Czech Republic, England, and Germany) can be found.
We checked the robustness of our results to changes in both regression speciﬁcation and estimation
sample. Checks of the former type included the clustering of standard errors at game level, the
inclusion of country-speciﬁc time trends across qualiﬁcation rounds, and the use of identiﬁers for
games of teams that are in the same group as the respective betting country. Changes in the latter
dimension included the restriction of the estimation sample to games in which at least one of the
betting countries participated, to games not involving teams in the same qualiﬁcation group as
the betting country unless the latter itself represents the home or away team, and to games for
which quotas are oﬀered by all twelve betting countries. None of these checks changed our results
15materially. The already noted near statistically signiﬁcant positive (negative) bias for Spain (the
Netherlands) in home games in our baseline regressions at times turned signiﬁcant, while the weakly
statistically signiﬁcant positive (negative) bias for Italy (Slovenia) in home games occasionally got
insigniﬁcant, although only barely (p-values then mostly fall in the range of 0.10-0.12). Results for
away games were virtually unchanged throughout.24
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided a ﬁrst theoretical treatment of how national sentiment in the form of
either a perception or a loyalty bias of bettors may bias across countries odds for win marketed for
own national teams in sports competitions. Based on a unique data set of online betting quotas
from twelve European countries for qualiﬁcation games to the UEFA Euro 2008, we then analyzed
empirically diﬀerences in odds for win oﬀered across countries for evidence of systematic biases in
the pricing of own national teams.
We found several countries to exhibit such biases in pricing behavior, some positive, and some
negative. Biases furthermore appeared to be more frequent in home than in away games, and
countries with positive biases (Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, and Spain) outweighed in number coun-
tries with negative biases (France, Slovenia, and Sweden). For the former group of countries,
national sentiment of bettors in the form of either or both a perception and a loyalty bias may
explain observed deviations in odds marketed. In the latter group of countries, in contrast, bettors
must have been subject to a loyalty bias that dominated domestic wagering behavior. Overall, our
empirical results provide strong evidence for a sizeable inﬂuence of sentiment on wagering market
outcomes in Europe. An interesting question, though one beyond the scope of the present paper,
is why national sentiments seem to express themselves so diﬀerently across wagering markets in
Europe. Another natural extension to our study would be the analysis of further markets to see
whether national sentiment inﬂuences behavior also in other areas of the economy.
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